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A B ST R ACT. For centuries, the law has prevented people from purchasing insurance on the
life or property of strangers because such insurance contracts would give policyholders incentives
to end the life or destroy the property in order to collect the insurance payout. The law thus
requires that policyholders have an "insurable interest" in the person or property they insure,
and contracts lacking such an "insurable interest" are invalidated by courts as against public
policy. This Note presents an economic analysis of the insurable interest requirement, and
argues that the doctrine creates perverse incentives that encourage the very practices the doctrine
seeks to deter. In addition to failing on its own terms, the doctrine also invites unfairness and
inefficiency in the insurance market. This Note concludes that the best way for courts to prevent
insurance contracts on the life or property of strangers may be to refrain from invalidating such
contracts in the first place.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Russian classic Dead Souls,' a businessman invents a clever scheme to
turn a legal quirk to his own advantage. The government taxes the gentry for
every serf owned, but the government infrequently conducts the official census
that counts taxable serfs. The businessman seeks to purchase dead serfs who
remain on the tax rolls -reducing the owners' tax liabilities while enhancing
the businessman's social standing on account of his newly acquired serfs. In
defense of this distasteful-but-legal bargain, the businessman assures us, "You
see, it's my practice never to depart from the letter of the law.... The law,
sir-I'm speechless when confronted with the law."2 Truth being only slightly
less strange than fiction, many observers have recently criticized the practice of
corporations purchasing life insurance on their employees3 and hedge funds
purchasing the policies of wealthy seniors.4 Detractors have labeled these
practices "dead peasant" insurance,' and they have lamented the presence of
"investors willing to bet on when [someone] will die."6 Indeed, these practices
evoke a discomfort akin to the purchase of dead serfs. And yet, just like the
purchase of dead serfs, these practices are enabled and encouraged by the
"letter of the law." That law is the "insurable interest" doctrine.
Some may find this charge puzzling, for the doctrine has long been thought
to protect against the kinds of "dead peasant" practices decried above. The
insurable interest doctrine requires that the person who holds an insurance
policy have some significant interest in the continued existence of the person or
property insured by the policy. In other words, one cannot purchase a life
insurance policy on a stranger or a property insurance policy on the stranger's
property. This insurable interest requirement dates back to nineteenth-century
England, and it remains a well-entrenched principle of modern insurance law.
Insurance policies that compensate beneficiaries upon the death of a person or
1. NIKOLAI GOGOL, DEAD SOULS (David Magarshack trans., Penguin Books 1961) (1842).
2. Id. at 45.
3. See Susan Lorde Martin, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial Scheme that Takes
Advantage of Employees and Shareholders, 58 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 653 (2004); see also Ellen E.
Schultz & Theo Francis, Worker Dies, Firm Profits-Why? Many Companies Insure Staff,
Yielding Benefits on Taxes, Bottom Line, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at Al.
4. See Charles Duhigg, Late in Life, Finding a Bonanza in Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2006, at Ai.
S. Charity Rush, Comment, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance (a/k/a 'Dead Peasant' or 'Dead
Janitor' Policies): Has Texas Buried the Insurable Interest Requirement?, 41 Hous. L. REv. 135,
136 (2004).
6. Duhigg, supra note 4.
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destruction of property that the beneficiary does not have an interest in
preserving give beneficiaries an incentive to murder the insured person or
destroy the insured property. This incentive is a form of "moral hazard,"7 and
the purpose of the insurable interest doctrine is to eliminate such moral hazard
by invalidating insurance policies thought likely to inflame it-policies that
lack an "insurable interest."
This Note takes issue with the conventional view of the insurable interest
doctrine and argues that the doctrine tends to undermine the very aim it
purports to advance. Moreover, the doctrine encourages unfairness and
inefficiency in the insurance market. These perverse consequences suggest that
the doctrine may do more harm than good and that we ought to give serious
consideration to abandoning it.
This conclusion runs against the grain of much insurance law scholarship.
Many scholars share the view that "the history of insurance furnishes many
illustrations of the abuse of freedom of contract."8 In this view, "the legal
system [stands] as a traffic policeman actively adjusting the rules in order to
regulate" the insurance market. 9 Yet, this Note tells a different story by
illustrating how insurance companies can abuse the legal rules that aim to
regulate them, and how a return to freedom of contract-that is, a return to the
discipline of the market-offers the more promising approach. When they act
as "traffic policemen," judges create ex ante uncertainty about the
enforceability of insurance contracts, and insurance companies can exploit this
uncertainty to the detriment of policyholders and third parties.
This Note traces the unintended consequences of such uncertainty along
three different dimensions. First, the potential that an insurance contract may
be voided for lack of insurable interest creates perverse incentives that
undermine the doctrine's own purpose of reducing moral hazard, causing the
doctrine to fail on its own terms. When an insurance policy is invalidated for
lack of insurable interest, the insurance company is relieved of its obligation to
pay under the policy. The prospect of invalidation reduces the expected costs of
a policy to an insurer and thereby encourages insurers to issue more such
policies. Meanwhile, doctrinal uncertainty permits insurers to maintain the
appearance of good faith for policies that are not clearly invalid when issued.
Taken together, these dynamics create perverse incentives that work to
subsidize moral hazard rather than to discourage it.
7. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
8. FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 627 (3 d ed. 1986).
9. MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 237 (1977)
(discussing the views of a nineteenth-century insurance treatise author).
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Second, uncertainty about the doctrine's application creates an opportunity
for insurers to exploit policyholders, thus impeding the goal of fairness in the
insurance market. Here, uncertainty about the ultimate validity of an insurance
policy with a questionable insurable interest permits insurers to issue policies
that appear valid to policyholders, but that may nevertheless be deemed invalid
by courts. The potential for invalidation decreases the value of the policy to the
policyholder but increases the value to the insurer. Yet unsophisticated
insurance purchasers may not anticipate that the insurable interest doctrine
could ultimately render their insurance policies worthless.
Third, the imperfect relationship between the legal standard of "insurable
interest" and the actual presence of moral hazard suggests that the doctrine
may end up invalidating unobjectionable and mutually beneficial insurance
contracts, thus impeding the goal of economic efficiency in the insurance
market. Not all policies deemed to lack an insurable interest create an
intolerable level of moral hazard. Hence, to the extent that "insurable interest"
is an imperfect proxy for the existence of such moral hazard, the doctrine
prohibits efficiency-enhancing activity without the offsetting benefit of
reducing moral hazard.
The insurable interest doctrine, and its underlying "traffic policeman"
approach, thus frustrate important goals along three key dimensions of
insurance law- the doctrine's own purported goal of reducing moral hazard,
the additional goal of fairness to insurance policyholders, and the general goal
of economic efficiency in the insurance market. In light of these flaws, I suggest
that the best way to fix the age-old doctrine may be simply to cast it aside. °
1o. The insurable interest doctrine has garnered the most attention in the context of
controversial "corporate-owned life insurance" policies, with scholars arguing that the
insurable interest requirement should be used to prevent companies from purchasing
policies on the lives of their employees. See Michael J. Henke, Corporate-Owned Life
Insurance Meets the Texas Insurable Interest Requirement: A Train Wreck in Progress, 55 BAYLOR
L. Rav. 51 (2003); Martin, supra note 3; Rush, supra note 5. Two scholars have undertaken
economic analysis of the insurable interest doctrine, but their analyses defend rather than
criticize the doctrine. See Samuel A. Rea, Jr., The Economics of Insurance Law, 13 INT'L REv. L.
& ECON. 145 (1993); George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of Company-Owned Life
Insurance (COLI): Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 357 (2003). To the extent scholars have critiqued the insurable interest doctrine at all,
they have merely lamented the doctrine's ambiguity or argued for a particular change in the
substance of the doctrine as applied in particular instances. See, e.g., Franklin L. Best, Jr.,
Defining Insurable Interests in Lives, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 104 (1986); Emetic Fischer, The Rule
of Insurable Interest and the Principle of Indemnity: Are They Measures of Damages in Property
Insurance?, 56 IND. L.J. 445 (1981); Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest
in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (1948);
Edwin W. Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life, 18 COLUM. L. REv. 381 (1918); Peter Nash
Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical Reassessment, 53
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Rather than acting as traffic policemen, courts should leave the policing to
insurance companies themselves. Market pressures give insurance companies
significant incentives to reduce intolerable moral hazard on their own, and they
are better able to do so than courts. Eliminating the insurable interest doctrine
would make insurers bear the cost of moral hazard rather than subsidizing the
cost and thereby encouraging it.
Part I of this Note explains the history and traditional rationale for the
insurable interest doctrine. Part II then introduces two complications to this
rationale - first, the doctrine's inherent ambiguity, and second, the doctrine's
inexact connection to the traditional concern of "moral hazard." Part III argues
against the insurable interest doctrine, illustrating how the complications
discussed in Part II generate perverse incentives, insurer exploitation, and
general inefficiency. Part IV discusses three potential modifications to the
insurable interest doctrine and argues that none of these modifications offers a
fully satisfying solution. Finally, Part V explains why the insurable interest
doctrine is unnecessary and suggests that abandoning the doctrine may be the
best solution.
I. THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST
DOCTRINE
The law has long required that insurance policyholders have an "insurable
interest" in the life or property they insure. Indeed, scholars have maintained
that insurable interest "is the very warp and woof of the enforcibility [sic] of
insurance contracts."'" Insurable interest usually functions as a defense
employed by the insurer, justifying nonpayment after a particular insured
event has come to pass. The insurer argues that the beneficiary of an insurance
contract lacks the requisite insurable interest in the insured person or property.
If a judge finds that the contract lacks an insurable interest, the judge will hold
it void as against public policy. Deemed unenforceable, the contract no longer
obliges the insurer to pay the promised amount to the beneficiary.
Although this doctrine of insurable interest remains well-entrenched in
American statutory and common law, its origins and subsequent evolution tell
a more complicated story. Under English common law, insurance contracts
were enforceable even if they lacked an insurable interest. 2 This state of affairs
DRAKE L. REv. 477 (2005); Note, Castle Cars, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.: The
Bona Fide Purchaser's Insurable Interest in Stolen Property, 68 VA. L. REv. 651 (1982).
ii. Harnett & Thornton, supra note io, at 1163.
12. See FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE LAW OF LIFE INSURANCE S 58, at 91 n.i (New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co. 1891) (listing cases) ("[I]t is worthy of note that the doctrine, though
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persisted until 1746, when Parliament passed a statute outlawing "wagering"
contracts on marine insurance.'3 The statute declared that "no assurance ...
shall be made by any person.., on any ship.., by way of gaming or wagering
... and ... every such assurance shall be null and void to all intents and
purposes."' 4 A subsequent Act in 1774 extended this prohibition from marine
insurance to life insurance: "Whereas ... the making insurances on lives ...
wherein the assured shall have no interest, hath introduced a mischievous kind
of gaming: ... no insurance shall be made by any person ... on the life.., of
any person.., wherein the person ... for whose.., benefit.., such policy...
shall be made, shall have no interest....""
As the statutes' language reveals, the chief original purpose behind the
insurable interest requirement was to prevent use of insurance contracts to
gamble or speculate on ships and lives. The drafters of these statutes figured
that this "mischievous kind of gaming" could be limited by striking down
contracts lacking an insurable interest.' 6 The insurable interest requirement
would distinguish between contracts that sought to dampen the risk of actual
future loss and those that instead sought to speculate on whether some future
contingency would occur. Without an insurable interest, there would be no
actual loss; the contract would thus be a pure gamble.
Despite the focus on gambling, however, the English statutes alluded to an
additional rationale for the insurable interest requirement. According to this
justification, contracts lacking an insurable interest create an incentive for the
beneficiaries to destroy insured property or end insured lives. Hence, the Act of
1746 noted that insurance contracts lacking insurable interest "hath been
productive of many pernicious practices, whereby great numbers of ships ...
have ... been fraudulently lost."' 7 This rationale for the insurable interest
doctrine has come to be known as the concern of "moral hazard." If a
policyholder does not have an interest in the continued life of a person covered
by the policy, that person has the ill fortune of being worth more to the
policyholder dead than alive; likewise, insured property is worth more
destroyed than preserved. "Moral hazard" in the context of insurance law
describes situations in which the existence of insurance increases incentives for
loss. Although "moral hazard" is often used to refer to a policyholder's
commonly supposed to be a common law doctrine, is not, viewed in the light of its origin, a
common law doctrine at all .... ").
13. Act of 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, § i (Eng.).
14. Id.
15. Act of 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, § i (Eng.).
16. Id.; see also Act of 1746 § i (referring to "a mischievous kind of... wagering").
17. Act of 1746 5 1.
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tendency to take less care in safeguarding her own insured property, it also
applies more broadly to situations where a policyholder has insured the
property or person of another. In this latter situation, the existence of moral
hazard increases the risk of loss to those third parties insured by the
policyholder."
Hence, in modern economic terms, the moral hazard created by an
insurance contract lacking an insurable interest can be understood as a negative
externality.' If A insures B such that B is the holder of an insurance policy on
C's property or her life, and B has no interest in C, then B has an incentive to
destroy C's property or life. Hence, the contract between A and B increases C's
risk of loss, even though C is not party to the insurance contract. This risk
burdens C with a cost for which she is not compensated.
Although Parliament's antigambling campaign initially overshadowed the
moral hazard concern, subsequent evolution of the insurable interest doctrine
reversed these priorities such that moral hazard is now thought to be the
doctrine's primary rationale. The earliest reported American decision regarding
insurable interest, handed down in 1815, did not cite the original English
statute, but it did treat the insurable interest requirement as a dictate of public
policy to be enforced by state common law.2" By 1881, the Supreme Court,
sitting in diversity jurisdiction, had merged the antigambling and moral hazard
rationales, explaining that without an insurable interest, "the [life insurance]
contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly
interested in the early death of the assured."2 Although this formulation of the
doctrine's rationale retained the language of its antigambling predecessor, its
thrust and substance rested on the modern moral hazard concern. The Court
labeled insurance policies lacking insurable interests as "mere wager[s]," but all
insurance policies are in some sense "wagers." Indeed, scholars have observed
the "difficulty of upholding an analytical distinction" between wagering and
insurance contracts, since every insurance contract assigns an expected value to
a possible contingent outcome, and it allocates the risk of this outcome
between the two parties to the contract. The Court's modern formulation
is. In both single-party and third-party situations, moral hazard may include not only the risk
of loss due to carelessness, but also risk due to fraud or other willful actions.
19. See Swan, supra note lO, at 379-80.
2o. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. (1 Tyng) 115 (1815).
21. Warnockv. Davis, 1o4 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
22. Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned To
Love Risk, ioo COLUM. L. REv. 1096, 1121 (2000). The presence of an insurable interest
makes such contracts differ only in this respect: insurance compensates for loss, i.e., the lost
interest; wagering seeks a pure "windfall" gain. Yet one quickly sees the circularity of this
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thus does not deride all insurance "wagers," but rather only those wagers that
are harmful. And it takes the chief harm to be the risk of moral hazard imposed
on third parties.
In a later case, Justice Holmes crystallized the moral hazard focus even
more emphatically:
A contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured has no interest
is a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister counter interest in
having the life come to an end.... The very meaning of an insurable
interest is an interest in having the life continue and so one that is
opposed to crime.
23
One scholar has thus observed, "While all courts paid it lip service, those in the
majority of jurisdictions seem to have seen the anti-gambling crusade as less
compelling justification for invalidating ... insurance policies [lacking an
insurable interest]. '" 4 Rather, moral hazard became the core concern,2" and in
distinction. It defines wagering contracts as those lacking insurable interest, and thus not
compensatory, but it does not explain why we should care whether or not a contract is
compensatory. It thus merely restates the insurable interest requirement without justifying
it. Naturally, then, the search for such justification collapses into the more substantial
concern of moral hazard. A better way to distinguish insurance from wagering would
emphasize the fact that insurance contracts aim to reduce overall risk, rather than merely
allocate it. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing aggregation and
segregation mechanisms for reducing risk). This better distinction, however, does not
necessarily require an insurable interest. See infra Part V.
23. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1911).
24. Kreitner, supra note 22, at 1123. The primary cause of this shift probably involved the
difficulty of analytically distinguishing insurance from wagering. The distinction simply
could not be sustained in a meaningful way. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Additionally, however, the shift likely reflected growing toleration of financial speculation
(i.e., "wagering") as well as a growing acceptance of insurance as a legitimate means of
savings and investment. Kreitner has noted that "the connection between gambling and
insurance had at one time threatened the insurance industry directly by contaminating
insurance, labeling it an illegitimate and destructive social force." Kreitner, supra note 22, at
1115. In order to legitimize insurance, advocates had to persuade people that insurance did
not involve morally illicit "wagering," and the insurable interest doctrine was a means of
avoiding the label. Yet, as insurance became more respectable and speculation became more
tolerable, the need for this semantic game dissipated. Chronicling this shift, Kreitner
concludes that today "the normative question of the legitimacy of specific types of
transactions is not played out by arguing over whether they are gambling (everyone is
willing to admit they are), but rather, is displaced into the question of how they should be
regulated .... " Id. at 1137. The modem focus on moral hazard thus reflects this modem
question.
25. See, e.g., Getchell v. Mercantile & Mfr.'s Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 83 A. 8ol, 802 (Me. 1912) ("A.
should not be allowed to insure for his own benefit B.'s property in which A. has no
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the assessment of another leading insurance scholar, it remains "[t]he
predominant justification now given.""
As the insurable interest doctrine migrated from England to America, it
came to be understood primarily as a bulwark against moral hazard. In this
conventional view, the parties to an insurance contract cannot be trusted to
minimize moral hazards on their own. Judges must play the traffic policeman's
role, wielding the insurable interest doctrine to invalidate insurance contracts
that entail an unacceptable level of moral hazard and thereby pose a risk of
harm to third parties.
II. CONCEPTUAL COMPLICATIONS
At first, the traditional logic behind the insurable interest doctrine appears
quite compelling. Surely, insurance policies ought not give someone an
incentive to destroy someone else's life or property. Viewed ex post, everyone
would agree that a nefarious policyholder should not receive insurance
payments earned through crime or fraud. Yet if it is to have any value, the
insurable interest doctrine must do its work ex ante rather than ex post. Tort,
fraud, and criminal law will punish policyholders found to have committed
misdeeds. Hence, the traditional purpose of the insurable interest doctrine is to
prevent those misdeeds from happening in the first place -by eliminating the
ex ante incentives for their commission. Viewed from an ex ante perspective,
however, the logic of the insurable interest doctrine must face up to two
troublesome complications. The first complication is the practical difficulty of
identifying the circumstances in which an insurable interest exists. It illustrates
how application of the insurable interest doctrine will inevitably cause ex ante
uncertainty and ambiguity. The second complication is the imprecise link
between the legal definition of insurable interest and the actual presence of
moral hazard.
Although "[w]ithout the prerequisite of insurable interest, the [insurance]
contract is unequivocally unenforceable,"2 7  an insurance contract's
concern, and by the loss of which A. would not be directly and financially affected. To hold
otherwise would be to increase the moral hazard and to permit one man to profit by the
losses of another."), quoted with approval in Tischendorf v. Lynn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 208
N.W. 917, 920 (Wis. 1926); see also Teague-Strebeck Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Ins. Co.,
1999-NMCA-1o9, 29, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183, 1193 ("Given current societal attitudes
toward gambling, the moral-hazard concern appears to be the stronger peg on which to
hang the insurable-interest doctrine today.").
z6. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw AND REGULATION 201 (4 th ed. 2005).
27. Harnett & Thornton, supra note io, at 1163.
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enforceability hinges on how the courts choose to define "insurable interest."
And this task of definition has been highly equivocal. Indeed, confusion over
the meaning of "insurable interest" began with the original invention of the
doctrine, and such confusion has continued over centuries to the present day.
Defining an "insurable interest" in the context of life insurance, the Supreme
Court explained in 1881 that "there must be a reasonable ground, founded
upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or
affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of
the assured. ",28 Hence, an insurable interest can arise from "blood or affinity,"
or from a "pecuniary" interest. This sounds simple enough, but it raises far
more questions than it answers: How much blood? How much affinity? What
sorts of pecuniary interests? And how strong? Notice that these questions tend
to require judges to distinguish between degrees of interest, rather than kinds.
Making these distinctions can lead to ambiguity and uncertainty.
The law holds that you have an insurable interest in your immediate
family, including your spouse and minor children.29 Although this interest
exists even if your husband is an abusive tyrant, many courts will find no
insurable interest in your beloved grandmother, aunt, or son-in-law.3" And
although you have an insurable interest in your spouse, the courts are divided
about whether the insurable interest is contingent on your spouse's consent.31
And what about your fianc ?32 What about unmarried cohabitation?" And
28. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).
29. Swisher, supra note lo, at 498-99; see also, e.g., Dixon v. W. Union Assurance Co., 164
S.E.2d 214, 218-19 (S.C. 1968) (noting that a parent has an insurable interest in a son);
Tromp v. Nat'l Reserve Life Ins. Co., 53 P.2d 831, 833 (Kan. 1936) (noting that a wife has an
insurable interest in a husband).
30. See Swisher, supra note lo, at 499.
31. Id. at 5oo-o1.
32. Older precedents hold that a fianc6 has a love and affection interest. See Green v. Sw.
Voluntary Ass'n, 20 S.E.2d 694, 696-97 (Va. 1942) (holding that a fianc& has an insurable
interest in the life of the insured). However, the premise of these old cases has since been
undermined by modem abolition of actions for breach of promise to marry. See Swisher,
supra note io, at 5o8-1o (discussing the evolution and characterizing the older precedents as
"archaic").
33. See Rakestraw v. City of Cincinnati, 44 N.E.2d 278, 280-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942)
(concluding that a girlfriend has an interest in a live-in boyfriend, but mostly on account of
her financial dependence); 3 LEE R. Russ & THOMAs F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE
§ 43:23, at 43-27 (3d ed. 1995) ("[T]here must be indices of sufficient closeness between the
two so that it can be said that the beneficiary has an interest in the continued life of the
insured.").
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what if you are a same-sex couple?34 None of the answers to these questions are
clear. Parents and children generally have insurable interests in each other-but
only if the children are biological ones. For foster parents and stepchildren, the
answer is: it depends." Moreover, some courts have recognized insurable
interests of love and affection between siblings, but others have not. 6
In the absence of "blood or affinity," you can still establish an insurable
interest in someone if you can prove that you have a "reasonable expectation of
pecuniary gain" from that person's continued life and well-being.37 But what
counts as a sufficient expectation? Here too, the answer remains murky. The
courts have held that you have a pecuniary interest in your business partner."
But your interest may disappear if your partner is a slouch.39 Although you
may have no interest in an unproductive partner, you might have an insurable
interest in a former partner.40 Moreover, an employer can have an insurable
interest in an employee, but not just any employee. The employee must be
"crucial to the operation of the employer's business."41 The courts generally
agree that a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his or her debtor, but
they have trouble telling you the amount of insurance a creditor will be
permitted to hold. As one treatise unhelpfully but accurately warns, "each case
34- The issue of insurable interest for same-sex couples, even if sanctioned by civil unions,
remains "largely unresolved." Swisher, supra note io, at 507-08.
35. Insurable interest in this instance usually requires some kind of special economic
circumstances. See Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Insurable Interest of Foster Child or
Stepchild in Life of Foster or Step Parent, or Vice Versa, 35 A.L.R.5th 781 (1996).
36. See Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Insurable Interest of Brother or Sister in Life of Sibling, 6o
A.L.R.3d 98, 113-15, 118-20 (1974). Compare Century Life Ins. Co. v. Custer, 1O S.W.2d 882
(Ark. 1928) (finding brother's affection for his brother sufficient to establish insurable
interest), with Lewis v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 Conn. loo (1872) (finding brother's
affection insufficient).
37. Rubenstein v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 272, 278 (E.D. La. 1984).
38. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Insurance on Life of Partner as Partnership Asset, 56
A.L.R.3d 892 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Block v. Mylish, 41 A.2d 731, 735 (Pa. 1945) (requiring "reasonable ground ... to
expect some [pecuniary] benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the
assured" (quoting Warnock v. Davis, 1o4 U.S. 755, 779 (i88i))).
40. Compare Atkins v. Cotter, 224 S.W. 624, 626 (Ark. 1920) (finding that insurable interest
survives dissolution of a partnership), with Stillwagoner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d
354, 359 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding "that insurable interest does not survive the relationship
that created it").
41. RusS & SEGALLA, supra note 33, § 43:13, at 43-16; see also Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220
F. Supp. 2d 794 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (finding that Wal-Mart had no insurable interest in its
rank-and-file employees).
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has been decided on its own facts. '4 2 Hence, a familiar answer: it depends. It
depends, also, in cases where your interest involves some other kind of
contractual relationship. Here, you must be able to quantify your alleged
economic benefit, and a court must deem it "substantial." 43 Finally, for all
kinds of insurable interests in life, the courts disagree about whether an
insurance contract requires an insurable interest only at the inception of the
contract, or also at the time of the insured's death. Many courts require only an
initial insurable interest;44 others will disfavor such ephemeral interests.
4
1
For property insurance, defining insurable interest remains still more
difficult. Since the early nineteenth century, courts have debated whether the
insurable interest must involve a formal property right (the "legal interest"
test), or whether the interest need only involve a factual expectation of
economic gain (the "factual expectation" test). 46 In the 1805 case of Lucena v.
Craufurd, two English judges famously disputed the issue, and various states
continue to dispute it today. Historically, the "legal interest" test
predominated, but a surge of cases in the 198os made the "factual expectation"
test the current majority rule. 47 According to that rule, the insurance
beneficiary need not have a property right in the insured property; rather, the
beneficiary need only expect to derive actual economic gain from the property's
continued existence.
In the words of one observer, however, the debate between "legal interest"
and "factual expectation" remains "[o]ne of the most ancient yet continuing
controversies" engendered by the insurable interest doctrine.4s Indeed, the
failure to resolve this issue over the past 200 years suggests an inherent and
irresolvable dilemma: because it looks only to objective legal rules to determine
the existence of a property right, the "legal interest" test is easier to apply; but
42. WILLIAM R. VANCE & BUIST M. ANDERSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 5 32, at
201 (3d ed. 1951).
43. Swisher, supra note io, at 521-22.
44. See id. at 523-24 (noting, but criticizing, the majority rule that an insurable interest need only
exist at the inception of the contract).
45. See, e.g., Stillwagoner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding
that "insurable interest does not survive the relationship that created it"). This approach
also finds favor with academic commentators. See Swisher, supra note lo, at 523-31.
46. Compare Le Cras v. Hughes, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 549 (K.B.) (applying "factual expectation"
test), with Lucena v. Craufurd, (18o5) 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (H.L.) (applying "legal interest"
test).
47. See Delk v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 81 P.3d 629, 636 (Okla. 2003) (adopting the "factual
expectations" test, but observing that American jurisdictions "are divided" on which test to
use).
48. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 82 (3d ed. 1996).
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because people have many economic interests in property they do not formally
own, it remains a poor yardstick for measuring a person's actual interest in a
piece of property. Likewise, because it looks beyond formal property rights to
one's real-world expectation in a piece of property, the "factual expectation"
test better reflects actual interests in property; but because it requires
discerning a subjective expectation, it remains hopelessly difficult to apply.
Neither the underinclusive "legal interest" rule nor the vague "factual
expectation" standard provides a measure of insurable interest that can be both
accurate and predictable. The modern "factual expectation" test usually
requires that the economic expectation be "substantial" 49 -and therein lies the
rub. Determining what counts as a substantial "factual expectation" involves a
necessarily subjective, fact-bound, case-by-case approach."0 Moreover, not only
must an insurable interest exist, but the "indemnity" principle of property
insurance requires that the amount of the insurance be no greater than the
"value" of the insurable property interest.5 ' Of course, this question of
valuation has been controversial.5 2
In both life and property insurance, therefore, the definition of insurable
interest is erratic, ambiguous, and inconsistent. Such difficulties produce ex
ante uncertainty about the ultimate validity of a given insurance contract in
two ways. First, many elaborations of the insurable interest doctrine are simply
uncertain at their core. For example, the "reasonable expectation of pecuniary
gain" standard for life insurance and the "substantial factual expectation"
standard for property insurance both apply a principle - expectation- that
depends heavily on the specific facts of a particular piece of property or
personal relationship. There may be nearly as many different expectations as
there are relationships. Second, even in areas where the insurable interest
doctrine takes the form of rules rather than standards, the rules remain
unpredictable. Some questions are simply unsettled, with many jurisdictions
that have yet to express a clear view on some relationships -including, for
example, cohabiting couples, fianc6s, and same-sex couples. On other
questions, the courts have created uncertainty by changing their minds. For
49. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw 34Ol (McKinney 2007).
5o. See RUss & SEGALLA, supra note 33, § 42:1, at 42-5 ("[T]he resolution of an insurable interest
dispute will turn on specific and unique facts as they pertain to the particular relationship. A
single fact can alter whether one party to the relationship has an insurable interest.").
51. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.1(a), at 135 (1988) ("Almost all
types of insurance are designed to provide no more than reimbursement for an insured....
The concept that insurance contracts shall confer a benefit no greater in value than the loss
suffered by an insured is usually referred to as the 'principle of indemnity."').
sa. See Fischer, supra note lo, at 462-66 (discussing three different methods of valuation used
by judges).
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example, many courts have shifted over time from the legal interest test to the
factual expectation standard for property insurance. 3
Because it remains a difficult task to determine whether an insurable
interest exists, parties to insurance contracts often bargain in the shadow of
uncertainty. One insurance company general counsel observed this sense of
uncertainty, noting that the definition of insurable interest remains "vague and
inconsistent" and that the courts have given insurers "little guidance" as to
when an insurable interest may exist.54 Indeed, it has always been so: in 1891,
one treatise writer called the insurable interest doctrine "false, artificial and
confusing"; ss in 1918, another scholar lamented the "great diversity of judicial
opinion" ;6  in 1948, another observer noted the "sharp conflict of
authority";17and by 1986, the definition of insurable interest was still
"contradictory and vague.", 8 Despite two centuries of change and common law
evolution, the chief defining characteristic of the insurable interest doctrine has
been its persistent uncertainty. The doctrine amounts to a pile of inconsistent
rules teetering upon the shaky foundation of an indeterminate standard.
Writing in 1856, one court noted that "it would be difficult to lay down any
general rule as to the nature and amount of interest which the assured must
have." 9 And so it remains.
In addition to this problem of definition, the traditional justification for the
insurable interest doctrine must face up to another hard reality. The purpose of
the doctrine is to limit moral hazard, but the link between insurable interest
and moral hazard remains inexact. Even if we could be sure that an insurance
contract has an insurable interest, the presence of such an interest does not
necessarily reduce the contract's level of moral hazard. Rather, insurable
interest is simply a doctrinal proxy used by courts to invalidate insurance
contracts assumed to pose an intolerable level of moral hazard. Yet, insurable
interest is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of an intolerable level of
moral hazard. In many situations, other factors limit the amount of moral
hazard caused by a supposed lack of insurable interest. For example, a large
53. See, e.g., Cecil v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 83-966, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23209, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1984) ("The law of Pennsylvania in this area is somewhat confused, and
there appears to be no clear statement in the cases as to which theory governs in
Pennsylvania.").
54. Best, supra note lo, at 112.
ss. COOKE, supra note 12, § 58, at 9o.
56. Patterson, supra note lo, at 381-82.
57. Harnett & Thornton, supra note lo, at 1164.
58. Best, supra note lo, at 1o6.
59. Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 396, 399 (1856).
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company that insures a nonessential employee may still have plenty of reasons
not to murder the employee - among them, the fact that disappearing
employees would be bad for business. Likewise, a court may find that a person
has no insurable interest in her favorite aunt, but that person may nevertheless
have every reason to keep her aunt alive. Finally, a court may hold that
merchant Joe has an insufficient expectation of economic gain from farmer
Bob's field, but as best friends and longtime neighbors, Joe may have every
reason not to set fire to Bob's field.
Conversely, the presence of an insurable interest is no guarantee that the
insurance contract's moral hazard will be acceptably low. Some other motive
may be stronger than the insurable interest. For example, a secretly despised
spouse or a piece of property that the owner never liked in the first place may
be at risk. In these cases, the insurance contract would heighten the moral
hazard, despite the presence of an insurable interest. Moreover, the presence of
an insurable interest may in some instances actually increase the level of moral
hazard, since it can provide cover for criminal intent.60 Where lack of insurable
interest might have been probative of criminal guilt, the presence of insurable
interest can cover it up. A recently procured insurance policy on a murdered
immediate family member is easier to explain than one on a stranger.
Ultimately, insurable interest remains simply one factor in the moral
hazard calculus, and it may even cut both ways. A true estimate of an insurance
contract's moral hazard would require weighing both aggravating and
mitigating factors. It would also require a judgment about the acceptable level
of total moral hazard that should be tolerated. It cannot be true that any
amount of moral hazard is intolerable, even where the moral hazard risk is
externalized upon third parties. Property law, for instance, permits remainders
after life estates without reservation. If the grantor devises a life estate to A,
followed by a remainder to B, the grantor gives B an incentive to hasten A's
death. Yet, this is a moral hazard the law is willing to tolerate. Moreover, every
insurance contract entails moral hazard, and this includes all third-party
insurance contracts 6l where an insurable interest exists. Only a total
prohibition on third-party insurance would completely eliminate the
externality. Hence, the insurable interest doctrine functions simply as a
60. Harnett & Thornton, supra note lo, at 1182-83.
61. The term "third-party insurance" is often used to refer to liability insurance. This Note,
however, uses the term more broadly to describe any insurance policy under which one
person is entitled to receive payouts upon the death of another person (i.e., the third party),
or the destruction of another person's property. This is the situation in which the insurable
interest requirement becomes relevant.
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shorthand proxy for the existence of an intolerable degree of moral hazard. It
remains, however, a very rough one.
III. HOW THE INSURABLE INTEREST DOCTRINE FAILS
Despite the insurable interest doctrine's purpose of reducing moral hazard,
the doctrine falls out of step with its aspirations in two ways. First, inherent
ambiguity in the definition of "insurable interest" creates ex ante uncertainty
about whether a given insurance contract will ultimately be found enforceable.
Second, the inexact link between insurable interest and moral hazard suggests
that the insurable interest doctrine can only be a rough proxy for intolerable
levels of moral hazard. Although these complications to the traditional account
of the insurable interest doctrine have hardly remained secret over the years,
their implications have not been fully appreciated. This Part examines three
such implications, which together make the case against the insurable interest
doctrine. In particular, this Part will show how the two uncertainty and moral
hazard complications work together in pernicious ways to undermine the
doctrine.
A. Perverse Incentives
The most startling consequence of the insurable interest requirement is the
perverse incentive it creates for insurers to accept higher levels of moral hazard
than they would tolerate in the absence of the doctrine. Counterintuitively, the
insurable interest doctrine actually creates its own moral hazard -an incentive
for the insurer to overinsure. This incentive, in turn, increases the likelihood
that insurers will issue risky policies with higher levels of moral hazard. The
insurable interest doctrine's result thus tends to undermine its very purpose.
Recall that contracts invalidated for lack of insurable interest become void
and do not obligate the insurer to pay out its promised compensation. The
courts disagree about whether the insurer must refund premiums in such
cases.62 If the insurer does not refund the premiums, its net gain from the
invalidated contract would be equal to the total amount of the premiums paid;
if the insurer does refund the premiums, the insurer's net gain would be zero,
62. Compare, e.g., Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 79 N.E. 526 (Ind. App. 19o6) (refusing
disgorgement of premiums), with Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 28 So. 2d 91o
(Ala. 1947) (permitting disgorgement of premiums). See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra
note 51, § 3 .3 (d), at 16o-62 (discussing the issue and noting "relatively few judicial
decisions" on the question).
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resulting in no net loss." 3 In either case, the insurer would be in a better
position if the contract were invalidated than if the contract were enforced. If
the insurance contract were deemed enforceable because of a valid insurable
interest, then the insurer would bear a net loss, consisting of the total payout
minus premiums paid. Striking down contracts for lack of insurable interest
allows the insurer to escape its promised payment obligations.
The prospect that an insurance contract will be invalidated for lack of
insurable interest therefore reduces the expected cost of an insurance contract
to the insurer.64 A simplified example illustrates this point. Assume that a
given insurance contract has a 5o% chance of being invalidated for lack of
insurable interest. Assume also that the insured event has a 20% likelihood of
occurring and would require the insurer to pay out $1oo if the event occurred.
Without the insurable interest requirement, the expected cost of the insurance
contract to the insurer would be $20 (20% * $1oo). With the insurable interest
requirement, however, the expected cost of the contract drops to $io (20% *
50% * $1oo). Hence, the insurable interest doctrine effectively subsidizes risky
contracts. Moral hazard increases the probability that the insured event will
come to pass, but the insurable interest doctrine reduces the probability that an
insurer will owe a payout. As long as the probability of invalidating an
insurance contract is greater than zero, the actual cost of the contract (in our
example, $20) will always be more than the costs for which the insurer can
expect to be held liable (in our example, $1o). The difference between these
two costs represents the subsidy the insurable interest doctrine creates for the
insurer. If the insurer can purchase its risk at a subsidized discount, it is likely
63. In order to simplify the analysis, I put aside transaction costs, such as the costs of litigation.
Litigation costs would raise the cost to the insurer of invalidating an insurance contract for
lack of insurable interest. However, contracts with questionable insurable interests would
still remain more valuable to the insurer than contracts with clear insurable interests so long
as the reduction in the contract's expected cost (due to the prospect of invalidation) is
positive, even taking into account the expected cost of litigation. Moreover, even where the
insurer's litigation costs may exceed the benefits to be gained by challenging the contract,
litigation costs will also raise the cost to the beneficiary of enforcing such contracts. Hence,
even where litigation costs are great, the parties are likely to settle, and the amount of the
settlement is likely to be less than the full value of the contract.
64. Discussing the implications of uncertainty in a different context, one scholar has explained
that "uncertainty occurs whenever people cannot be sure what legal consequences will attach
to each of their possible courses of action." John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects
of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 968 (1984). Hence, in
an uncertain situation, "from the [potential litigant's] point of view the rule of law is that
distribution of probabilities." Id. at 970.
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to purchase more of it by accepting insurance contracts with higher levels of
moral hazard.6s
We can refine this analysis by introducing a few additional complications.
The first involves the relationship between insurable interest and moral hazard.
Just like the law, insurers also want to minimize moral hazard and reduce
risk.66 Ordinarily, the insurance contract would become less attractive to the
insurer as the risk of loss due to moral hazard increases. Yet, the contract also
becomes more attractive to the insurer as the likelihood of invalidation for lack
of insurable interest increases. Hence, as long as the probability of invalidation
increases by more than the probability of loss due to moral hazard, each
additional unit of moral hazard represents a marginal gain for the insurer.
Figure 1 illustrates the phenomenon; the shaded area above the line shows the
gain to the insurer.
65. If one posits a perfectly competitive insurance market, the incentive for insurers to
overinsure may diminish somewhat. In such a situation, the insurer's gain from the
potential invalidation of the insurance contract would be passed along to insurance
purchasers in the form of lower premiums. Insurers may not capture the full value of the
subsidy, and their incentives to overinsure may thus be reduced. However, this objection
probably does not go very far for two reasons. First, the underlying assumption of a
perfectly competitive insurance market is highly unrealistic. Courts and commentators have
long observed significant information asymmetries between insurers and purchasers in the
insurance market, and such asymmetries make it possible for the insurer to capture a
significant amount of the subsidy. See infra notes 7S-77 and accompanying text. Although
even consumers who do not understand the terms of an insurance contract have good
information about the contract's price, the competitiveness of the insurance market may still
be limited by consumer search costs and by tacit collusion. Second, even under the unlikely
assumption that the insurer passes the entire subsidy on to the policyholder, the insurable
interest requirement would have a neutral effect at best. Insurers would be indifferent to the
absence of insurable interest, but they would still not be averse to it. Hence, even if it did
not actively encourage moral hazard, the doctrine would still fail to discourage it.
66. See infra Part V.
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Figure i.











PROBABILITY OF MORAL HAZARD
Since insurable interest is at best a rough proxy for moral hazard, there will
inevitably be instances where the increased probability of invalidation is greater
than the increased probability of moral hazard -the shaded area in Figure 1.
Indeed, ironically, the more aggressively courts apply the insurable interest
doctrine, the higher the probability of invalidation, and thus the larger the
shaded area becomes.
So far, I have assumed that insurers incur no liability for issuing invalid
contracts in bad faith. If an insurer issues a contract with the knowledge that it
clearly contains no insurable interest, the insurer may be held liable.
6 7
However, as shown above, the insurable interest doctrine remains so
ambiguous that many cases will not be clear. There will be plenty of cases with
a probability sufficiently low-say, 8o%, as illustrated in Figure z-to make a
plausible claim that an insurable interest exists. Hence, the insurer would still
have an incentive to accept a marginal unit of moral hazard so long as the
probability of invalidation (that is, the ex ante obviousness of the lack of
insurable interest) remains below 8o%. This highlights the central role of
doctrinal uncertainty in creating the perverse ex ante incentive: the incentive
will not exist if the contract clearly lacks an insurable interest, nor will it exist if
the contract clearly contains one. Rather, the incentive thrives in the uncertain
67. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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68area in between. The ambiguity and inconsistency built into the insurable
interest doctrine guarantee that this area remains significant.
B. Potential Exploitation
If the insurable interest doctrine creates perverse incentives that exacerbate
the moral hazards of third-party insurance contracts, the costs of this flaw in
the doctrine fall squarely on the shoulders of the third party. The moral hazard
in such a third-party insurance contract creates an externality, and more moral
hazard means a greater externality.69 This realization might be enough on its
own to cast doubt on the insurable interest doctrine, since it turns the avowed
purpose of the doctrine on its head. Yet, the doctrine works additional mischief
as well. The doctrine imposes costs not only on third parties, but also on the
holders of insurance policies. The insurable interest doctrine creates an
opportunity for insurers to exploit less sophisticated insurance purchasers by
acquiring what amounts to an embedded option while capturing the entire
value of that option. Thus, the insurable interest doctrine also impedes goals of
fairness and equity in the insurance market.
One scholar has posed, but not answered, a "most curious" question: "Why
is this insurable interest requirement not expressly identified and fully
explained in present-day life insurance applications and policies ?7o In light of
the murky insurable interest doctrine, why don't insurance contracts clarify, ex
ante, their insurable interest requirements? On a similar note, one might also
wonder why insurers have recently bemoaned the practice of investors
purchasing the life insurance policies of wealthy seniors when the insurers
might have prevented the practice through stipulations in the insurance
68. Undermining the traditional economic justification for the insurable interest requirement,
this phenomenon supports the theory that "when [the certainty] assumption is abandoned
... many traditional conclusions of the law-and-economics literature can no longer be
defended on economic grounds." Calfee & Craswell, supra note 64, at 965-66. It also casts
doubt on the more general economic justification for striking down contracts as against
public policy. Dismissing the objection that the potential for contract invalidation creates
incentives for sophisticated parties to make unenforceable contracts with ignorant parties,
one scholar notes that "[c]ourts can mitigate this behavior.., by allowing damages against
parties that knew or should have known better." Note, A Law and Economics Look at
Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARv. L. Rav. 1445, 146o (2006). Uncertainty makes it
impossible to know better.
69. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
70. Swisher, supra note io, at 540.
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contracts.7 ' An answer to these "curious questions" lies in the fact that insurers
may prefer the insurable interest doctrine's uncertainty to any more certain
alternatives negotiated through ex ante bargaining. The doctrine permits a sly
practice that might be called "the insurable interest two-step": First, sell your
customer an insurance contract with as much willful indifference to insurable
interest requirements as doctrinal ambiguity will allow. Second, if the insured
event comes to pass, claim that the contract had no insurable interest after all
and escape obligation for payment. This two-step allows insurers to exploit
unsophisticated policyholders, and the insurable interest doctrine's ambiguity
acts as a willing accomplice. If the doctrine were entirely clear, the two-step
would be transparent, but ambiguity provides cover that makes the two-step
appear less nefarious than it may be.
This potential for exploitation can be sharpened by thinking of the
insurable interest doctrine as creating an embedded option in the insurance
contract.72 An embedded option is an opportunity to take some future action in
response to an eventuality that remains presently uncertain. 71 One may have no
desire to take the action at the present time, but the ability to take the action
can become desirable if circumstances change in the future. Hence, the choice
of whether to challenge the insurance contract for lack of insurable interest
amounts to an option held by the insurer - an option to breach without paying
damages. If the insured event never happens, the insurer has no need to
exercise its option. If the event does happen, however, the insurer can exercise
its option by invalidating the contract for lack of insurable interest. Of course,
the value of the insurer's option is limited by the fact that the insurer might fail
to convince a court to invalidate the contract.74 However, the option value
increases as the probability of invalidation increases, and even a relatively
pi. The New York Times stated that insurance executives worry that such practices "may cripple
[the] industry," and noted that insurance companies have attempted to block such practices
by raising the insurable interest doctrine to prevent payouts. Duhigg, supra note 4.
72. See IAN AYRES, OPTIoNAL LAw: THE STRucruRE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005) (discussing
how option theory can explain the structure of legal rights); see also Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1428 (2004) (applying option theory to contract remedies). The relationship
between option theory and the invalidation of contracts as against public policy does not yet
appear to have garnered scholarly attention. However, the discussion here builds on a useful
recent article applying option theory to the interpretation of vague and indefinite contracts.
See George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1664 (2006).
73. Geis, supra note 72, at 1669-1703, 1669 n.21.
74- Cf id. at 1698 (noting how such an option differs from a conventional option).
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modest probability of invalidation may still make the option quite valuable to
the insurer.
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with an insurance contract
that gives one party certain embedded options. The problem, however, comes
if the option holder is able to expropriate the value of the option from the other
party. The insurer's option to breach with a significant probability of avoiding
damages greatly increases the total value of the insurance contract to the
insurer while simultaneously reducing the value of the contract to the
policyholder. In a perfectly competitive market, the option value would be
reflected in a reduced contract price (i.e., insurance premium) paid by the
policyholder. In such a market, the embedded option would have no significant
fairness consequences, since competition would force the insurer to pass on any
gains from the option to the insurance purchaser.
However, this is not likely to happen in the insurance market, where
significant information asymmetries exist between insurers and
policyholders.7" Spotting an embedded option created by the insurable interest
requirement demands considerable legal expertise about the intricacies of the
insurable interest doctrine and the likelihood of its application to a particular
case. Moreover, valuing the cost of the option to the policyholder is even more
difficult than spotting it. Although an insurance company may employ an army
of lawyers, most insurance purchasers do not.7 6 Unlike explicit options written
into contracts, embedded options operate such that the "option seller may be
much less likely to realize exactly what she is trading or the nature of the risk
she accepts. ' 77 Because of this information asymmetry, the insurable interest
doctrine may cause the insurance policy purchaser to buy insurance for much
more than it is actually worth.7' Figure 2 illustrates the effect of an option held
by the insurer but unperceived by the purchaser:
75. See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?:
Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 995, 1047 (1992) (noting a "general understanding that
the average insurer is much more sophisticated and knowledgeable than the average
insured"). Indeed, asymmetric information, caused by the fact that insurers are repeat
players and insurance contracts are highly complex, has been one common justification for
the rule that ambiguous terms in insurance contracts should be interpreted against the
insurer. Id. at 1047-59.
76. See id. at 1047 n.2o ("The insured's use of an attorney to review a proposed insurance
contract is unheard of at the level of consumer insurance contracts.").
77. Geis, supra note 72, at 1704.
78. One might argue that the policyholder need not understand the value of the contract's terms
so long as she knows its price. In a perfectly competitive market, insurers would bid down
the price until it reflected the actual low value of the contract given its dubiously enforceable
terms. There are two problems with this objection. First, consumer search costs and tacit
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Figure 2.
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If the policyholder overlooks the cost of the option, the parties will trade at
Q and P,. However, since the insurer's option reduces the value of the
insurance to the policyholder, the option shifts the policyholder's actual
demand curve to the left. If the policyholder had perfect information about the
insurer's embedded option, the parties would trade at %, and P2. Instead, the
policyholder ends up purchasing more insurance at a higher price than she
desires. In sum, the insurable interest doctrine, by enabling the insurable
interest two-step, creates an opportunity for insurers to take advantage of less-
sophisticated insurance purchasers. Insurers can secure a valuable embedded
option without having to compensate the unsuspecting policyholders who may
learn only after the fact that their contract is worth much less than they had
bargained for.
collusion may still limit the competitiveness of the market. Second, even if price competition
ensures that a policyholder gets what she pays for, imperfect information about contract
terms would still mean that the policyholder does not get what she bargains for. The
policyholder may pay a lower price for a policy that is worth less, but the policyholder's
failure to realize that it is worth less will cause her to rely on the insurance to her detriment.
Assuming that the insurance will cover the insured risk, the policyholder will not avail
herself of insurance substitutes, such as savings and investment, to cover the unknown,
uninsured risk. Hence, even with perfect price competition, the policyholder would incur
this reliance cost.
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C. General Inefficiency
So far, this Note has demonstrated how the insurable interest doctrine
creates perverse incentives for insurers to issue insurance policies that increase
the risk of moral hazard to third parties and how the insurable interest doctrine
gives insurers an opportunity to exploit policyholders. A third problem with
the insurable interest doctrine concerns the inefficiency the doctrine can create
in the insurance market as a whole, negatively affecting both insurers and
policyholders. This inefficiency occurs particularly in situations, unlike those
discussed in the previous two sections, where no uncertainty surrounds
application of the insurable interest doctrine or where both parties to the
insurance contract have sufficient information. In these situations, the concerns
about perverse incentives and exploitation become less significant, but a
different concern emerges: in these cases, the insurable interest doctrine is too
effective. It overreaches by invalidating insurance contacts which, under its
own rationale of moral hazard, do not need to be invalidated.
Here, the chief culprit is the inexact relationship between insurable interest
and moral hazard. To the extent that insurable interest acts as an imperfect
proxy for intolerable levels of moral hazard, it creates a gap between contracts
with a legitimately intolerable level of moral hazard and those with a tolerable
level but that are nevertheless swept into the insurable interest doctrine's net.
This area between insurable interest and moral hazard includes cases where an
insurance contract contains an insurable interest, but a judge erroneously finds
that it does not, as well as cases where an insurance contract lacks an insurable
interest, but nonetheless does not create an intolerable amount of moral
hazard. As shown in Part II, there may be a considerable number of cases in
this area.
If the parties are well-informed and can be reasonably sure that the
insurance contract will be invalidated for lack of insurable interest, they will
not enter into the contract in the first place. Hence, in this instance, the
insurable interest requirement acts as an arbitrary and undesired cap on the
kinds of insurance consumers may desire and insurers may be willing to
provide. Where insurance contracts do not pose a high risk of moral hazard,
and thus will have no socially harmful effect, the insurable interest requirement
will prevent parties from securing the benefits of these benign contracts. When
both parties to the insurance contract are prevented from engaging in mutually
beneficial trade, deadweight loss and inefficiency result.
In sum, this inefficiency results from the regrettable but inevitable fact that
insurable interest remains an imperfect proxy for moral hazard. Of course, any
attempt to avoid contracts that pose intolerable levels of moral hazard will
inevitably have to rely on such proxies, and any proxy will inevitably be
117:474 2007
INSURANCE LAW'S HAPLESS BUSYBODY
overinclusive in some respects. The particular degree of moral hazard in an
insurance arrangement cannot be estimated with perfect accuracy on a case-by-
case basis. Hence, one could argue that the inefficiency discussed here may
simply be a cost that must inevitably be paid in order to avoid or reduce the
moral hazard inherent in insurance contracts. The insurable interest doctrine
may not be perfectly efficient, the argument goes, but it remains the most
efficient option available.
However, this defense of the insurable interest doctrine rests on the
questionable assumptions that insurable interest is the best judicial proxy for
moral hazard and that judges, acting as "traffic policemen," are the best entities
to be wielding such proxies. Although insurable interest may be the best
possible judicial proxy, I argue in Part V that insurance companies themselves
are likely to do a better job than judges at detecting and evaluating moral
hazard-and at discovering potentially superior proxies. As we will see, using
the insurable interest doctrine to ferret out moral hazard is less efficient than
the alternatives.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This Note has shown how the insurable interest doctrine can undermine its
own purpose by creating perverse incentives that increase the moral hazard risk
to third parties; how the doctrine can cause unfairness by encouraging insurers
to use their information advantages to exploit insurance purchasers; and how
the doctrine can foster inefficiency by invalidating certain insurance contracts
that pose no intolerable moral hazard risk. Contrary to initial assumptions, and
perhaps a bit counterintuitively, the insurable interest doctrine actually hurts
the very third parties it seeks to protect-as well as hurting, in different ways,
both actual parties to the insurance contract. One may reasonably wonder,
however, whether these consequences can be avoided by repairing the
traditional insurable interest doctrine rather than abolishing it. This Part
considers three possible improvements -a clearer doctrine, stronger insurer
tort liability, and third-party standing to challenge insurance contracts-and
explains how none of these improvements offers a fully satisfying solution.
A. Clearer Doctrine
The most obvious improvement to the insurable interest doctrine would be
to clarify the doctrine's ambiguities. This would reduce ex ante uncertainty
about whether an insurable interest exists in a given case, and it would thus
reduce the perverse incentives that increase moral hazard and constrain the
ability of insurers to take advantage of policyholders. Over the years, many
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observers have bemoaned the doctrine's ambiguity and have called for courts to
speak with more clarity and consistency in defining what counts as an
insurable interest.
79
It remains telling, however, that these calls for clarity have emerged
repeatedly with every successive generation of new scholars and lawyers over
multiple centuries-and that the calls for clarity have met with little success.
This does not inspire confidence that the doctrine can suddenly be made clear
after all. As hinted in Part II, the ambiguity problem runs deeper than the need
to simply get the rules right and stick to them. Rather, the insurable interest
doctrine's persistent ambiguity inheres in the very concept of "insurable
interest" itself. Although the doctrine works in a binary way, either invalidating
contracts that lack an insurable interest or enforcing contracts that contain one,
the concept of insurable interest is not binary. Insurable interest is a question
of degree, not kind; it asks us to measure the magnitude of our interests in
relationships with those around us. Any attempt to distill this messy reality
into a neat set of binary doctrinal rules will inevitably fail. Application of the
insurable interest doctrine thus requires reliance on the subjective standard
that remains at its core.
This difficulty can be seen in the age-old debate over whether to apply a
"legal interest" rule or "factual expectation" standard to determine the
insurable interest in property.s Reacting to the artificial formalism of the
"legal interest" test, midcentury realists called for the doctrine to become more
flexible-and thus more standard-like.8 Yet, as I have shown, uncertainty is
the cost of such realism, 8' and too much uncertainty can create perverse
incentives that swallow the entire purpose of the insurable interest standard.
Courts have heeded the advice of the realists and moved from the "legal
interest" rule to the "factual expectation" standard. Perhaps this move toward
more uncertainty could be reversed and some satisfying and more certain rules
79. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
8o. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
81. In an article whose title called for a "socio-economic reevaluation" of the "legal interest" test,
two scholars worried that "legal rules will calcify and become divorced from basic social
values." Harnett & Thornton, supra note lo, at 1162. They added: "In order to prevent this
deterioration into a set of fixed and unyielding 'principles,' constant and vigilant
reevaluation of concepts is necessary to enable legal concepts to keep pace with adjustments
in external variables." Id.
82. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557,
569 (1992) ("[A] standard requires a prediction of how an enforcement authority will decide
questions that are already answered in the case of a rule.").
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could be found to replace it.83 Yet, even so, a more rule-like approach would
come with problems of its own- problems of formalism and overinclusiveness,
which the insurable interest realists have justifiably criticized.84 In contrast to
the flexible "factual expectation" standard, a more rule-like doctrine would
artificially narrow the situations in which an insurable interest is found to exist.
The doctrine would therefore be overinclusive to the extent it would invalidate
insurance contracts that would have otherwise been deemed valid.
In sum, the insurable interest doctrine cannot escape the ambiguity
inherent in the concept of "insurable interest." And, as I have shown, even a
relatively modest amount of ambiguity in the insurable interest doctrine can
create an incentive for insurers to accept higher levels of moral hazard or take
advantage of policyholders. Moreover, even if the doctrine could be made
much clearer and more predictable, this result would inevitably make the
insurable interest requirement more overinclusive, and thus more likely to
reduce the efficiency of the insurance market by invalidating insurance
contracts where no intolerable moral hazard actually exists.
B. Insurer Tort Liability
Another possible approach would be to hold insurers liable in tort for
issuing insurance policies where the insurer knows that the policyholder lacks
an insurable interest. 8s Most jurisdictions already recognize an "implied duty of
fair dealing" in insurance contracts, and they have interpreted this duty as
83. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988)
(observing the cyclical nature of common law shifts between standards and rules, the
inevitable "blurring of clear and distinct property rules with the muddy doctrines of 'maybe
or maybe not'" followed by "the reverse tendency to try to clear up the blur with new
crystalline rules").
84. See Kaplow, supra note 82, at 590-93 (noting that the shift from standards to rules trades
uncertainty for over- and underinclusiveness).
8s. This can be considered a stronger version of the controversial doctrine holding that insurers
can be estopped from raising an insurable interest defense if they acted in some way that
amounted to a waiver of the insurable interest requirement. See, e.g., McGehee v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422 (ioth Cit. 1984) (holding that knowledge of insurer amounts to
waiver of insurable interest requirement). Many courts, however, refuse to apply waiver and
estoppel doctrines to contracts against public policy. See, e.g., Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins.
Co., 550 A.2d 677, 687-88 (Md. 1988); Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bolling, 1O
S.E.2d 518, 522 (Va. 1940); see also Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 33, § 41:7, at 41-15 ("[T]he
rule prevails in many jurisdictions that where a life insurance policy is void at its inception
because the beneficiary lacks insurable interest, it cannot be rendered valid or enforceable by
waiver or estoppel .. ").
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creating a tort cause of action against insurers who act in "bad faith., 86 Hence,
insurer tort liability might prevent insurers from using the insurable interest
doctrine to take advantage of policyholders.
The problem with this approach, however, is the familiar one of doctrinal
ambiguity. Insurers can use ambiguity in the insurable interest doctrine to
argue that they were in fact acting in good faith. It would not be enough for a
policyholder merely to show ex post that the insurance contract lacked an
insurable interest.8 7 To establish bad faith, courts tend to require evidence of
"intentional" and "reckless disregard" for policyholders, and courts resist bad
faith actions where the disagreement over a claim is "fairly debatable.,
88
Unfortunately for policyholders, many questions related to insurable interest
are fairly debatable. To prevail, a policyholder would have to show that the
insurer intentionally issued an insurance policy which the insurer knew lacked
an insurable interest."s In light of uncertainty surrounding the insurable
interest doctrine, these situations would be rare. In fact, insurers are most
likely to take advantage of policyholders in cases where the insurable interest
doctrine is ambiguous, since the uncertainty in the doctrine tends to increase
the insurer's informational advantage over the policyholder. Where the
doctrine is clear, the policyholder is more likely to know what her legal
entitlements are. Ironically, then, insurer tort liability would be least powerful
in precisely those cases where it is most needed.
C. Third-Party Standing
The final possible modification to the insurable interest doctrine would
expand restrictions on who is entitled to raise the insurable interest claim. In
86. See Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining
the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 26-30 (1992); see also Ben Kingree & Louise Tanner, Life Insurance as Motive for
Murder, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 764 (1994) (discussing cause of action against insurers for
negligent issuance of insurance, where insurers "unreasonably imperil the lives of their
insureds").
87. Cf. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 1977) ("We recognize
that there can be disagreements between insurer and insured on a variety of matters such as
insurable interest, extent of coverage, cause of loss, amount of loss, or breach of policy
conditions.").
88. Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-77 (Wis. 1978).
89. A negligence standard would be no better. Under even a negligence standard, an insurer's
inability to predict that a court would find an insurable interest would likely be a sufficient
defense. So long as there remains some uncertainty, it would be difficult to hold that a
reasonable insurer should have known that an insurable interest did not exist.
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most states, only the insurer can raise the insurable interest defense, and thus
benefit from invalidation of the insurance contract. In a few states, however,
the estate of the deceased can claim the life insurance payout.9" At least with
respect to life insurance, this approach eliminates the perverse incentive for
insurers to accept intolerably high levels of moral hazard, since the insurable
interest doctrine would no longer permit insurers to evade payouts. Although
this approach remains the minority view among courts, it has garnered support
from a number of scholars. 91 However, even if this expansion of standing to
raise the insurable interest claim may be the most promising modification to
the insurable interest doctrine, it remains problematic in a number of ways.
Many courts have resisted third-party standing on the ground that it
violates "privity of contract" principles by allowing the insurance contract to be
challenged by someone who is not a party to it.92 Ordinarily, nonparties do not
have standing to challenge a contract. This reasoning has been dismissed as a
kind of rigid and unnecessary formalism.93 The dismissal, however, overlooks a
significant and legitimate concern. If the party entitled to the insurance payout
under the contract did not have a hand in causing the person's death, third-
party standing would take the insurance payout from the innocent party and
transfer it to the estate of the deceased. Third-party standing would thus
punish the innocent and give a windfall gain to the undeserving. One can
understand why courts would seek to avoid this inequitable result.
This noncompensatory wealth transfer would simultaneously fix the
perverse incentives of insurers and increase the tendency for the insurable
interest doctrine to ensnare policyholders - solving one problem while
inflaming another. Insurers would be indifferent to the presence of an
insurable interest, while unsophisticated policyholders would continue to
suffer from their lack of information about the intricacies of the insurable
interest doctrine. The trap for the unwary would remain, the difference simply
being that the third party's estate would collect the spoils. The inherent
ambiguity in the insurable interest doctrine would generate a litigation
bonanza for third-party estates. Moreover, well-informed policyholders who
anticipate the possibility of litigation would likely avoid any contracts involving
uncertain insurable interests. In these cases, the insurable interest doctrine
go. Texas has the most well-established system. See, e.g., Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 22o F.
Supp. 2d 714, 784-85 (S.D. Tex. 2002); see also Rush, supra note 5, at 155-57 (explaining the
mechanics of the Texas approach).
91. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 4 7[b], at 328 (3d ed. 2002);
KEETON &WIDISS, supra note 51, § 3.3(c)(1), at 156; Swisher, supra note lo, at 532-37.
92. See, e.g., Hicks' Estate v. Cary, 52 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. 1952).
93. See Swisher, supra note to, at 532.
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would inefficiently overdeter. Meanwhile, the perhaps larger group of
uninformed policyholders would continue to purchase insurance policies at a
higher price than they would be willing to pay with more information. In sum,
third-party standing fixes the insurable interest doctrine's most grievous
problem -the tendency to undermine its own purpose of preventing moral
hazard -while exacerbating the doctrine's other problems.
V. A RADICAL SUGGESTION
I have shown the insurable interest doctrine's unintended consequences,
and I have considered how efforts to tinker with the doctrine fail to wholly fix
the doctrine's flaws. It is worth considering, then, whether we might be better
off eliminating the doctrine altogether. This remains a radical suggestion,
given the doctrine's ancient provenance and exalted status. Yet, it deserves
serious consideration. Although we should not expect any legal doctrine to
operate flawlessly, our task remains a comparative one: does the insurable
interest doctrine work better or worse than the unregulated market it seeks to
replace? This Part argues that the market would work better. Insurers have
both the incentive and the ability to avoid moral hazard on their own, and
insurers will likely do a better job of reducing moral hazard than courts. Hence,
the best way to advance the purpose of the insurable interest doctrine may
simply be to get rid of it.
To understand the incentives at play in the insurance market, one needs a
rudimentary understanding of how insurance works and why insurers have an
interest in reducing moral hazard themselves. Insurance is a mechanism for
shifting and reducing the uncertainty of probabilistic loss. An insurance
company's customers pay a set premium in exchange for the company's
promise to pay compensation if a loss occurs. Moreover, the amount of the
premium paid will be set equal to the expected value of the loss, plus
administrative costs. Consumers thus trade risk for certainty-predictable
premiums and compensation instead of worry about whether future loss might
occur. 94 Why would an insurer want to purchase risk, and how can the insurer
profit from it? This purchase may initially seem like gambling, but it is not. If
consumers simply lent their money to a gambler, they would receive no
certainty that the gambler would have enough money to pay in the event of a
loss. Unlike a gambler, an insurance company profits by acquiring the risk of
its consumer, converting this raw risk into certainty, and then selling the
94. Consumers generally value certainty because they are risk averse. See generally ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 48-52 (5th ed. 2008) (explaining how risk
aversion drives the demand for insurance).
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certainty back to the consumer in the form of premiums that equal the
expected cost of payouts. The insurer acquires the consumer's risk, not simply
as a gamble, but because the insurer is better than the consumer at reducing it.
In this way, one can think of an insurance company as acting like a factory in
the manufacturing business, where the product it manufactures is certainty.
The insurance company uses two key mechanisms to turn risk into
certainty- aggregation and segregation. First, the insurance company
aggregates a large number of uncorrelated (i.e., statistically independent) risks
together. This process takes advantage of the law of large numbers, which
holds that the distribution of probabilities clusters around the mean as the size
of a sample increases. In other words, what seems random and risky in an
individual case can become predictable in the aggregate. It might be difficult
for me to know the odds of my particular house burning down, but an
insurance company can much more easily and accurately predict the odds of
thousands of houses burning down each year.
Despite aggregation, however, people pose varying levels of risk depending
on their circumstances. An insurance company can use aggregation to predict
reliably the probability of loss for a group of aggregated risks, but it would face
a problem known as "adverse selection" if it charged every consumer premiums
based on the average risk of the aggregated group. Low-risk people whose
individual risk fell below the average would pay more in premiums than their
individual probability of loss; high-risk people above the average would pay
less. If the disparity between the premiums paid and the risk level of low-risk
people becomes too great, these people will drop out of the risk pool.9" Hence,
as one scholar has put it, "insurers are competing over the relatively low-risk
insureds of any risk pool, who are likely to select that insurer most precisely
able to price the risk the insured brings to the pool. ''96 With adverse selection,
the insurance company would not be able to give its low-risk customers the
certainty they demand because it would not be able to charge them premiums
equal to their expected loss. In other words, the insurance company would
have manufactured certainty in the aggregate, but it could not provide this
certainty to individual customers. Hence, in order to refine this aggregate
certainty into individual certainty, insurance companies employ a mechanism
called "segregation." Insurers segregate higher and lower risks into narrowly
defined risk pools, thus reducing the range of risks contained in any one pool.
The closer low-risk people are to the average risk of the pool, the less tendency
95. They can do this by switching to another insurer who can insure them for lower premiums,
or by abandoning insurance in favor of other methods of risk avoidance. See id. at 65-67.
96. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1545
(1987).
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there will be for adverse selection. Accordingly, insurance companies best
provide certainty to their low-risk customers by setting premiums as closely as
possible to the probability of loss for the low-risk members of the pool.
Aggregation and segregation together help produce this certainty.
Turning to the matter of moral hazard, if we think of an insurance
company as a factory that manufactures certainty, we can think of moral hazard
as a wrench thrown into the machinery. Moral hazard is commonly defined as
the tendency for an insured party to take less care to avoid an insured loss than
the party would have taken if the loss had not been insured, or even to act
intentionally to bring about that loss. 97 Moral hazard thus puts upward
pressure on the risk of loss for any given risk pool and threatens to cause
adverse selection as those insureds most susceptible to moral hazard increase
the risk of the pool. To prevent adverse selection effectively, insurers must
pursue two strategies. First, they try to skim insureds with high risks of moral
hazard out of the risk pool and segregate them into higher-risk pools with
higher premiums. This effectively forces insureds to internalize the risk of
moral hazard by paying premiums equal to the expected cost of the loss plus
the cost of moral hazard. In this situation, the insured does not gain from her
moral hazard since she pays for the cost of it. Alternatively, if the insurer
cannot effectively segregate out of the risk pool those at higher risk of moral
hazard, the insurer will do everything possible to reduce the moral hazard
itself. Rather than passing on the cost of moral hazard to the insured, the
insurer will bear the cost by way of adverse selection. Insurance companies use
a number of devices to reduce moral hazard, including deductibles,
coinsurance, coverage limits, and coverage exclusions. 9
Insurance companies thus make their money by manufacturing and selling
certainty, and their ability to compete in the market for certainty depends on
their ability to reduce or internalize moral hazard. The more successfully they
do so, the more profitable they will be. Most observers agree that insurance
companies have a powerful incentive on their own to control moral hazard. 99 If
insurers are obliged to pay out when losses occur, insurance companies will
internalize the cost of moral hazard-even where that cost falls on third
97. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 7.
9s. Id.
99. See, e.g., id. ("Insurers attempt to combat ... moral hazard with a variety of devices.");
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 94, at 53 ("Every insurer is aware of this [moral hazard]
problem and has developed methods to minimize it."); George L. Priest, Insurability and
Punitive Damages, 4o ALA. L. REv. 1009, 1025 (1989) ("No one would contest that it is in the
interest of an insurer (as well as of the society) for the insurer to encourage all feasible
precautions to reduce the likelihood of unintended harm.").
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parties.1"0 This concern for moral hazard explains many common insurer
practices that have arisen not from judicial imposition, but rather from the
insurance market itself. For example, many life insurance policies contain a
suicide exclusion, denying payouts for death by suicide for the first two years
of coverage. 1 ' Many insurers reduce fire insurance premiums for homes with
smoke alarms. Property insurance often requires deductibles. And so on.
The insurable interest doctrine is ordinarily justified on the ground that it
prevents a negative externality, namely the risk to third parties caused by the
insurance policy's moral hazard. Hence, one might argue that even if the
insurable interest doctrine works imperfectly it still offers some worthwhile
protection to third parties that they would not receive in the doctrine's absence.
However, there is reason to think that third parties might be better off without
the doctrine. As demonstrated in Part III, the net consequence of the
ambiguous insurable interest doctrine may be to increase, rather than reduce,
the total amount of moral hazard externalized upon third parties. At the same
time as the doctrine deters potentially hazardous insurance contracts where
there is clearly no insurable interest, it encourages potentially hazardous
insurance contracts where the existence of an insurable interest is less certain.
But even assuming that clear cases predominate over unclear cases, the
insurer's own incentive to reduce moral hazard is likely to offer at least as much
protection when lack of insurable interest is clear and moral hazard is high. If
this is the case, third parties are better off without the insurable interest
doctrine and the offsetting moral hazard costs that doctrinal ambiguity creates.
The insurer's incentive to reduce moral hazard protects third parties by
ensuring that policyholders either internalize the risk to third parties or do not
receive coverage on high-risk policies at all. As the preceding discussion
illustrates, an insurance company, in the absence of the insurable interest
doctrine, could potentially issue a risky policy on the life or property of a third
party. But it will only do so if it can segregate such a policy into a risk pool with
high premiums that compensate for the high risk of loss. These high premiums
force policyholders to internalize the moral hazard cost and make the purchase
of such high-risk policies unattractive. Alternatively, if an insurance company
moo. Cf. Priest, supra note 99, at 1023-26 (explaining why insurers, out of concern for moral
hazard, exclude intentional action from liability insurance coverage).
ioi. Although "omni-present," the exclusion is typically limited to two years. Id. at 1o24 & n.56.
It remains unclear whether this limitation arises from insurers' decision that two years is
enough to control moral hazard, or instead from regulatory or judicial pressure to expand
coverage. Id. at 1o24 n.56.
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cannot adequately segregate such high-risk policies and thereby effectively
internalize the risk of moral hazard, it will simply deny coverage.
If, as this Note has argued, insurers' incentives naturally align with the
insurable interest requirement's policy of reducing moral hazard, then the only
remaining question involves the relative capacities of courts and insurers to
effectively further this goal. Courts fare poorly in this reckoning, applying
inconsistent and unpredictable rules, creating perverse incentives, fostering
unfair exploitation, and breeding inefficiency. The transaction costs of
litigation and judicial enforcement add additional problems for courts. The
insurable interest doctrine functions analogously to a sort of ill-defined
coverage exclusion -albeit one drawn up ex post. Courts have no particular
expertise in assessing degrees of risk. In fact, the inconsistent state of the
insurable interest doctrine suggests that judges are not well-equipped to think
in probabilistic terms. Attempting to convert the probabilistic notion of moral
hazard into an abstract, binary rule about "insurable interest" inevitably
spawns a tangle of smaller rules, standards, and exceptions that bear at best a
convoluted connection to the original notion of moral hazard. Courts have no
rigorous way of assessing whether "insurable interest"- by which I mean the
bloated doctrinal apparatus constructed to define the term -is in fact the best
proxy for moral hazard. Perhaps other, less abstract proxies could be found to
do the job better. However, if judges continue to apply the insurable interest
doctrine, we will never know. "Insurable interest" is the rule, and judges get
paid to follow rules.
Insurers, however, do not get paid simply to follow rules. They get paid to
reduce uncertainty by assessing risk. In setting premiums and segregating risk
pools, insurers have become experts at doing exactly what the insurable interest
requirement asks judges to do -identify and avoid intolerable levels of risk.
Indeed, this task, which includes the effort to reduce moral hazard, amounts to
the very raison d'Etre for insurance underwriters in the first place. Insurance
companies collect large amounts of data on probabilities of loss, and they
remain in the best position to tease out the most effective proxies for risk of
loss due to moral hazard. Unlike judges, insurers think in probabilistic terms,
and are best able to act on judgments of probability once made. There is,
perhaps, one simple reason why insurers have not yet done more to find better
proxies to reduce moral hazard in third-party contracts: as long as the
insurable interest doctrine exists, insurers do not have to. As this Note has
argued, the doctrine subsidizes risky third-party contracts, reducing the need
for insurers to worry about moral hazard at all. In a most perverse irony, the
insurable interest doctrine has thus been paying insurers not to do their job.
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CONCLUSION
Nobody would claim that the insurance market, or any market, functions
perfectly. Indeed, there are areas in which the market legitimately calls out for
regulation. In those areas, the law's "traffic policeman" may play a vital role.
Here, however, we have seen a different side of the traffic policeman. When it
comes to the insurable interest doctrine, he looks a bit more like a hapless
busybody. Although the insurable interest doctrine seems to make sense at first
glance, it may not survive its own inherent ambiguity. As a result, the doctrine
generates perverse incentives that undermine its own purpose, creates an
opportunity for insurers to take advantage of policyholders, and generally
reduces the efficiency of the insurance market. Moreover, efforts to alter the
doctrine do not entirely resolve the difficulties, and the insurance market has
substantial incentives to further the purposes of the doctrine on its own. In
light of this, the radical suggestion to jettison the doctrine may not be so
outlandish after all. At the very least, it makes clear that we ought to begin
rethinking a doctrine that has been taken for granted for a very long time.
